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ABSTRACT
This article investigates how the budget priorities of Arkansas state government departments vary with changes in economic conditions. The Arkansas Revenue Stabilization Act
(ARSA) of 1945 established a formalized method of state budgeting by priorities. State funds
are allocated, meaning the funds are legally made available, according to priority levels established each year by the Governor and the General Assembly. Those allocated funds are
later distributed, meaning released for spending, according to priority levels as funds become
available. In this study, we ask the research question: Are departmental budget priorities
driven by stability or are they responsive to economic condition? Incrementalism suggests
that incremental annual changes in the budget are based on the previous year’s budget, they
take place across-the-board, and that there lacks an in depth consideration of priorities.
However, ARSA requires explicit prioritization within each department. Perceptions of economic conditions are likely to play into this prioritization. We hypothesize that the higher
priority items will follow a more incremental pattern of mostly being based on the previous
year’s budget in favor of stability. We also hypothesize that the economy has a greater impact
on the lower priority items in favor of economic responsiveness. Our findings suggest that
incrementalism is a persistent influence across priority levels. However, there is rational
consideration during an economic downturn that results in a decline in funding for lower
priority budget items.
Keywords: incrementalism, cutback budgeting, budget process, revenue stabilization, budget
priorities
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1. INTRODUCTION
Using Arkansas’ unique approach to budgeting by priorities, this study investigates how the budget priorities of state government departments vary with
changes in economic conditions. The Arkansas Revenue Stabilization Act
(ARSA) allocates state funds according to priority levels established each year
by the Governor in the Governor’s budget recommendation, with additional
changes and revisions resulting from the legislative consideration process of
the General Assembly. The allocated amount is the amount that is legally
made available for spending. ARSA dictates the order of distribution (release
for spending) of those allocated funds (Jordan, 2006).
Although as many as six priority levels have been allocated in any given
fiscal year, administrators generally view the lower priority allocations as activities and purchases that will take place only if the revenue is available.
Quarterly updates of the revenue forecast are used to inform administrators of
the likelihood of the distribution of funds to the lower levels. This strategy
creates confidence in being able to maintain the department’s capability to
implement programs and services that are deemed as high priority (Jordan,
2006).
The ARSA prioritization method of budgeting has the stated purpose of
stabilizing the budget during declining economic conditions resulting in revenue shortfalls. Jordan (2006) concludes that ARSA was effective at protecting
top priority budget items that made up almost 90% of the budget by essentially
creating a 10% cushion, which was greater than the size of most states’ rainy
day funds. As a result of this process, Arkansas lawmakers did not see a need
for a ‘rainy day’ fund also known as a stabilization fund which sets aside
funds for distribution when revenue falls short of expectations.
Arkansas administrators view the lower priority items as those activities
and associated expenses that will take place only if the revenue is available. If
revenue collections fall short of expectations, then the allocated items with the
lower priorities are not funded. Therefore, throughout the fiscal year, administrators execute their budgets with low priority items on hold until there is a
distribution of funds to pay for them. This prioritization method of allocation
and distribution was created to mitigate the impact of declining economic
conditions. A decline in the economy resulting in a revenue shortfall makes
funding of low priority items less probable. In this study of the ARSA approach to priority budgeting, we ask the research question: Are departmental
budget priorities driven by stability or are they responsive to economic condition?
Since 1945, Arkansas’ unique method of stabilization has served effectively its purpose of creating a cushion for declining economic conditions. However, in recent years the public financial environment in which ARSA operates
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has changed. The first change is the execution of significant funding reforms
in the mid-2000s resulting from the Lake View education finance equity litigation1. Lake View, a poor, rural school district, sued the state claiming that reliance upon local property taxes as the primary funding of education was unfair
to those in districts with low property value. The Arkansas Supreme Court
ruled the state’s funding as unconstitutional and that the state was solely responsible for the education system. Ultimately, primary education was ruled as
being a state constitutional obligation that requires “adequate” funding. The
rulings required a change in budget priorities, making primary (K-12) education the “highest priority,” effectively lowering the priority of other areas of
the budget (Jordan, et al., 2014).
Second, despite the effectiveness of ARSA, lawmakers established a rainy
day fund in fiscal year 2007 as a political signal that the state was fiscally responsible. A rainy day fund essentially creates a second opportunity for an
item to be funded even if revenue falls short. The Arkansas Rainy Day Fund
was created during a time of surplus but due to the subsequent recession did
not receive allocation for several budget cycles. In fiscal year 2012, the rainy
day fund received allocation for the first time of only $10 Million out of a
budget that is over $4 Billion. This amount is far less than the rule of thumb of
5%, which has often been found to be inadequate for state budget stabilization
(Joyce, 2001; Hou, 2004).
Finally, Arkansas was one of a few of states with a biennial legislature
which met every other year, in odd-number years. In 2008, there was a ballot
initiative to change budgeting to an annual process in order to make revenue
forecasting easier and more accurate. Voters unexpectedly approved the constitutional amendment to have legislators meet for a budget session in evennumbered years. This modification made the state one of the first to make the
switch in the budget process from biennial to annual within the last two decades (Snell, 2011).
Combined, these changes suggest a need to reexamine ARSA to determine
whether they have impacted departmental resource allocation decisions.
Therefore, we seek to determine if ARSA is still used to respond to economic
conditions. Our study spans the period 1992 through 2014, which encompasses these environmental changes surrounding ARSA.
2. ARSA ALLOCATION AND DISTRIBUTION
Table 1 shows the budget allocations and distributions under ARSA for
1992 through 2014. Across the years, the number of priority levels receiving
distributed funds fluctuated from four levels in the mid-1990s to only a portion
1. Lake View School District No. 25 v. Huckabee. 351 Ark. 31; 91 S.W.3d 472 (2002).
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of the first level in 2010. However, for most years, only the first two budget
levels are distributed. The consistent distribution of funds to the first priority
level is evidence of the efficacy of the process at protecting the top priority
budget items.
3. INCREMENTAL VS. RATIONAL APPROACHES TO BUDGETING
Wildavsky’s (1964) introduction of the incrementalism theory of budgeting has held a firm and prominent place in public administration. It theorizes
that the stickiness or stability of the status quo and limited comprehensive
consideration create across-the-board budget adjustments in small increments
from the base or previous budgeted amount. In theory, this decidedly nonrational approach is employed to mitigate conflict and the costs of negotiation
and, therefore, avoids strategic review and deliberation of the entire budget
(Schick, 1983). Robinson, et al. (2007) and Ryu, et al. (2008) conclude that
spending patterns can be largely explained by incrementalism. However, there
have been challenges to the exclusive focus on incrementalism that suggest
that there are more rational approaches to budgeting used in practice. In fact,
Reddick (2003) tests the use of incrementalism, the garbage can theory, and
rational approaches such as biennial budgeting, and he concludes that there is
not a singular “catch all” theoretical explanation of state budgeting (p. 337).
He finds a dominant presence of incrementalism in combination with rational
methods. This challenges the focus on incrementalism theory and suggests that
the budget in practice is more rational under certain conditions. We argue that
responding to strong economic downturns and allocating resources within specific budgeting frameworks require explicit and rational consideration of priorities used in cutback budgeting and various budget processes.
4. CUTBACK BUDGETING
Incrementalism as a budget theory was born during a time of resource increase. As a flip side to incrementalism, decrementalism avoids in-depth programmatic reviews and makes across-the-board small reductions. Decisions
are made on the margins, leaving most of the budget unexamined (Schick,
1983). Levine (1978) argues that in the face of “zero growth and absolute decline”, there is a need to re-examine the expansionist view of budgeting (p.
317). During strong economic downturns, states are faced with a balancedbudget requirement which brings about greater reductions via cutback budgeting instead of decrementalism. At a time of deep budget declines or cutbacks,
tough choices are not mitigated. The idea of a department receiving its fair
share of the budget adjustment cannot persist during cutback budgeting. As the
size of the cuts increase or the period of decline is prolonged (i.e. a long or
deep recession), the cuts become more targeted and, therefore, more rational
(Behn, 1985).
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Table 1. Budget Levels Allocated and Distributed Under ARSA
structure, 1992-2014
Year

Funding Allocation

Actual Distribution

Priority Levels Distributed*

1992

$2,175,189,495

$1,934,996,462

A+A1+55.28% of B

1993

$2,431,887,384

$2,076,967,023

A+A1+27.7% of B

1994

$2,270,946,228

$2,270,017,689

A+B+B1+C+90.27% of C1

1995

$2,400,379,719

$2,452,523,636

A+B+B1+C+C1

1996

$2,533,174,612

$2,631,960,737

A+B+B1+C+C1

1997

$2,685,312,075

$2,771,893,531

A+B+B1+C+C1

1998

$2,902,837,978

$2,969,804,598

A+B

1999

$3,009,281,308

$3,103,708,459

A+B

2000

$3,243,688,704

$3,176,581,515

A+79.91% of B

2001

$3,437,168,936

$3,258,940,496

A+40.6% of B

2002

$3,450,739,822

$3,238,373,556

98.72% of A

2003

$3,623,980,274

$3,250,769,591

93.94% of A

2004

$3,525,966,225

$3,598,842,591

A + B + B1

2005

$3,629,925,804

$3,937,142,958

A + B + B1

2006

$3,825,053,006

$4,227,770,000

A+B

2007

$4,058,615,931

$4,467,900,000

A+B+C

2008

$4,352,672,063

$4,529,200,000

A + A1+ B

2009

$4,523,673,103

$4,434,701,497

A + A1 + 53.9% of B

2010

$4,593,605,359

$4,323,207,922

94.73% of A

2011

$4,478,900,000

$4,572,847,441

A+B

2012

$4,605,925,000

$4,751,568,795

A+B

2013

$4,727,500,000

$5,026,990,611

A + $137.7 million

2014

$4,943,779,505

$5,022,445,083

A+B+C

*The letters used to denote priority levels come from the legislation. The variation in what the priority
levels are called is a matter of legislative preference. For instance, “A” is always the first priority level,
but the second priority level may be named “A1” or “B” in the legislation.

Levine (1978) defines cutback management as initiatives and interventions
needed to lead a public organization toward a more efficient organization that
consumes fewer resources. He argues that cutback management meant that
public managers have to consider tactics that are “inclusionary” in spreading
the share of budget cuts. A review of the annual Fiscal Survey of the States by
the National Association of State Budget Officers during the Great Recession
and its slow recovery period reveals that across-the-board cuts are a common
state government strategy during the recession, but the prevalence of targeted
cuts grew over the time period. This diffused strategy was confirmed by Klase
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(2011) in his comparison of state responses across two recessions in the 2000s.
As recession severity grew, states moved past the across-the-board cuts to
more targeted eliminations. During fiscal stress, cutback budgeting reflects
administrative choices that represent shifts in departmental programmatic priorities (Daugherty and Klase, 2009; Bartle, 1996).
Conant (2010) provides a summary of how six states dealt with budget
shortfalls during the Great Recession. He argues that in states with structural
deficits, the main driver and cause of the deficit was Medicaid; therefore,
Medicaid was a common target for budgetary cuts (Conant, 2010). In Connecticut, higher education was also targeted for cuts in spending, and other
agencies were targeted for elimination and consolidation (Dautrich, et al.,
2010). Massachusetts also targeted health care and education in addition to
state aid to local governments (Wallin and Snow, 2010). The targeted cuts
resulted from prioritization across functions. For instance, explanations asserted for targeting cuts to higher education and aid to local governments were
that those entities could raise their own revenue, and, therefore, were lower
priority for state funding.
5. BUDGET PROCESSES
Some budget processes are put in place with the intent of encouraging
planning and deliberate consideration of alternatives. Three such processes are
biennial budgeting, performance-based budgeting, and zero-base budgeting.
While annual budgeting is advocated as an important part of the budget reform
movement for increasing control, it decreases the time necessary for financial
planning. Therefore, the biennial budget process, which allows for a longer
planning period, is viewed as a more rational approach (Schick, 1983; Reddick, 2003; Hou, 2006). Until 2008, ARSA involved a biennial budget process
which required establishing priorities for two fiscal years.
Performance-based budgeting process has the purpose of implementing
planning, strategizing, and prioritizing into the budget process. Management’s
development of goals and objectives are integrated into the budget process and
decision making (Jordan and Hackbart, 1999; Hou, et al, 2011). While Jordan
and Hackbart find that performance-based budgeting is a useful managerial
tool that may not impact budget decisions, Hou, et al. observe that some states
use performance measurement for prioritizing budget decisions but perhaps
less so during fiscal stress.
Under zero-base budgeting, decision making is intended to be more rational and comprehensive because the base or previous amount is scrutinized and
decision makers are provided additional information for choosing between
alternatives (Draper and Pitsvada, 1981). Even the modern day version of zero-base budgeting requires a review of performance in addition to the delibera-
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tion of the base as opposed to assuming the base is a constant even if drilling
into the base is largely symbolic (Lauth, 2014).
Even as rational budget reforms, like performance-based and zero-base
budgeting, undergo many variations, their common intent seems to be to insert
prospective consideration of policy alternatives and priorities (Reddick, 2003).
What cutback budgeting and rational budget reforms have in common with
ARSA is that they move away from the across-the-board “fair share” assumption of incrementalism. They introduce prioritization into budgetary decision
making, which is the complexity that incrementalism theory is said to avoid.
6. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
The theory of incrementalism (and decrementalism) states that changes in
the budget will take place across-the-board in small increments from the previous year. The definition of “small increments” is not clearly defined in the
literature. However, the significance of the previous year as the basis of budget changes is consistent among incrementalist, which is the focus in this study.
The theory suggests a lack of in depth budget consideration of priorities. On
the other hand, ARSA requires explicit prioritization for each department, and
the prioritized order of distribution is contingent upon revenue flow. As Clemens and Miran (2012) note, state balanced budget requirements create a tight
relationship between state governments' revenues and expenditures.
Not surprisingly, the theoretical and empirical literature have shown that,
because budgeting is open to the environment (i.e., the economy), budget
strategies are more rational during specific economic periods, such as those
requiring cutback budgeting, particularly when the economy is expected to
change in the negative direction. Therefore, we hypothesize that the economy
will have a significant impact on budget decisions. However, because decision
makers are boundedly rational and likely to make decisions at the margin, we
expect that some features of stability will remain as budget decisions are based
on the previous year’s budget. Specifically, we hypothesize that the higher
priority items will follow a more incremental pattern, while the economy has a
greater impact on the lower priority items. The rational decision to place items
in priority Level 1 has already been decided in previous periods based on expectations regarding service levels and costs. Therefore, budget decisions over
time regarding priority Level 1 will not undergo additional scrutiny and will
be incremental. On the other hand, lower priority items will be subject to additional scrutiny and re-prioritization. We hypothesize that budgeting for higher
priority items tends to be more stable and incremental in nature due to the
need to maintain or protect basic funding needs. Therefore, allocation decisions for higher priority budget levels are expected to rely on the previous
year’s allocation. Lower priority items are considered more discretionary and
often subject to greater decision making scrutiny. Therefore, allocation deci-

78

Budgeting by priorities

sions for lower priority budget levels are expected to be less subject to incremental decision making, instead being more open and responsive to economic
forces and the perceived likelihood of greater or less revenues.
H1: Higher priority budget levels are related to the previous year’s budget
allocations, in support of incrementalism.
H2: Lower priority budget levels are related to perceptions of economic conditions, in support of rational decision making.
Previous research has found that state-level fiscal policy is asymmetric,
with differing responses to “expansions and recessions of equal magnitudes”
(Sorensen & Yosha, 2001, p. 47). A one percent expansion in gross state
product (GSP), for example, may not generate the same magnitude response to
a one percent contraction in GSP. To capture this asymmetry, we distinguish
between positive and negative changes in economic condition.
Given ARSA’s prioritization structure, we also expect there to be little differences across departments for higher priority budget levels in terms of allocation ratios. We expect that the size of the department will not matter for the
highest priority level. All departments and their advocates will seek to protect
the status quo of their highest priority items, and the stability of Level 1 priority will not vary across departments based on their size relative to the total
budget. However, we expect size of the department to matter at priority Level
2. Keeping in mind that there may be and often are more than two priority
levels, departments that are larger in size may have more budget items to categorize, which creates more opportunity to change the proportion of the items
categorized at priority Level 2.
7. DATA AND METHODOLOGY
Our study’s unit of analysis is department expenditures. The three dependent variables are:
(1) percent of the department’s budget that is allocated in priority Level 1;
(2) percent of the department’s budget that is allocated in priority Level 2;
(3) ratio of department’s budget in Level 2 to Level 1.
Arkansas departmental budget data are obtained from the state budget office for each priority level. Consistent with prior research on the Arkansas
priority budgeting approach (Jordan, 2006), we focus on 11 departments in the
state of Arkansas government from fiscal years 1992 to 2014. These departments are listed in Table 2. This table summarizes the department budgets in
terms of the percent of department budget in Levels 1 and 2 between 1992 and
2014, and also shows the variability of department budget allocations across
time. The proportion of the departmental budget in priority Level 1 is between
92% and 98%, averaging 96.1%, which is higher for each department than in
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Jordan’s 2006 study of ARSA; however the state’s grand budget total only
increased from about 90% to 92%. There is greater variation in departmental
budgets in Level 2 compared to Level 1. The average coefficient of variation
for Level 1 is 6.8% compared to 208.1% for Level 2. Differences in the coefficient of variation between Levels 1 and 2 is statistically significant at
p<.001.
Table 3 shows the department’s allocation ratios (Level 2 to Level 1) and
the size of the department’s budget as a percent of the state’s total budget. The
ratio of the department’s budget in Level 2 to Level 1 (column two in Table 3)
reflects an inverse measure of how much the department’s budget is prioritized at a higher level. A lower number for this ratio reflects greater reliance
on Level 1, and conversely less reliance on Level 2. This indicates that a
greater portion of the budget is categorized as high priority. There are several
observations where the department budget is 100% in Level 1, so the ratio of
Level 2 to Level 1 is 0.
Table 2. Percent of Department Budget in Level 1 and Level 2, 1992-2014
Level 1

Level 2

Department

Mean

Std Dev

CV

Mean

Std Dev

CV

Aging & Adult Services

92.20%

11.80%

12.80%

5.00%

9.70%

194.00%

Children & Family Services

94.00%

8.50%

9.00%

2.20%

4.80%

218.20%

Corrections

93.80%

5.50%

5.90%

4.10%

4.30%

104.90%

County Aid

96.50%

4.70%

4.90%

0.50%

2.00%

400.00%

Economic Development

97.10%

3.20%

3.30%

1.30%

1.70%

130.80%

Higher Education

95.00%

6.00%

6.30%

1.80%

2.30%

127.80%

K-12 Education

96.40%

4.00%

4.10%

2.30%

1.90%

82.60%

Labor

94.90%

8.40%

8.90%

1.20%

2.70%

225.00%

Municipal Aid

96.60%

4.70%

4.90%

0.40%

1.50%

375.00%

Parks & Tourism

95.50%

7.30%

7.60%

1.70%

5.10%

300.00%

State Police

92.60%

6.50%

7.00%

2.60%

3.40%

130.80%

We use the previous year’s budget decisions as the basis for measuring
budgeting stability (i.e. in(de)crementalism) and use changes in state-level per
capita personal income as the basis for understanding responsiveness to
changes in economic condition. Per capita personal income, like state GSP,
measures the economic well-being of a state (Broda & Tate, 2014) and, thus,
is appropriate to measure economic condition. Per capita personal income has
been broadly used in the literature as an indicator of economic performance
(see for example Bishop et al., 1992; Connaughton & Madsen, 2004; Garnick,
1990; Hofer & Wörgötter, 1997). The change in personal income is measured
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as the change in per capita personal income for the previous year. This is because budget decision making happens before the year commences, and decision makers are expected to use information available to them during the decision making period and not during the year for which the budget is being decided. Specifically:

Table 3. Allocation Ratios and Department Budget
Department

% B'ud!get iu Level Z
% Budget iu Level 1

Dept :B udget
state B11dJget

Aging & Adult Services

0.0723

0.37%

Children & Family Services

0.0290

1.32%

Corrections

0.0473

5.32%

County Aid

0.0015

0.61%

Economic Development

0.0125

0.26%

Higher Education

0.0196

15.65%

K-12 Education

0.0257

44.28%

Labor

0.0129

0.07%

Municipal Aid

0.0015

0.86%

Parks & Tourism

0.0216

0.55%

State Police

0.0282

1.26%

Note: We focus on the ratio of budget allocations in Level 2 to Level 1 because the amount allocated
to Level 2 is often small and sometimes zero. The ratio of Level 2 to Level 1 (as opposed to Level 1
to Level 2) is to avoid having a zero in the denominator.

Personal income data are obtained from the U.S. Bureau of Economic
Analysis. Since previous research has found that state-level fiscal policy is
asymmetric, we follow the methodology used by Sorensen and Yosha (2001),
and create two relative economic change variables representing upturns or
positive change (% Personal Income+) and downturns or negative change
(% Personal Income–). These relative change variables are measured in comparison to the average for the previous four year period, with an upturn corresponding to an above-average change in per capita personal income and a
downturn defined as a below-average change in per capita personal income.
More specifically,
%∆Personal Income+ = Positive percent change in per capita personal income; otherwise 0
%∆Personal Income– = Negative percent change in per capita personal income; otherwise 0.
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Table 4. Descriptive Statistics
Mean

Std. Dev.

Min

Max

% Budget in Level 1t

95.452

6.388

68.073

100

% Budget in Level 2 t

2.098

4.362

0

31.927

0.025

0.059

0

0.469

0.025

0.060

0

0.469

% Personal Incomet,+

1.009

1.373

0

4.834

% Personal Incomet,–

-1.147

1.680

-6.146

0

0.018

0.091

0.456

0.638

6.531

13.032

0.010

48.520

Year 2005

0.045

0.209

0

1

Year 2006

0.045

0.209

0

1

Year 2007

0.045

0.209

0

1

K12 department AND Year 2005

0.004

0.064

0

1

K12 department AND Year 2006

0.004

0.064

0

1

K12 department AND Year 2007

0.004

0.064

0

1

0.273

0.446

0

1

[%Budget in Level:Z]
%Budget in Level 1

x JOO%
t

Stability

[%Budget in Level 2]
% Budg~t in Level 1

t

1

Responsiveness

%AP ers 0111a] lrncomet

X

2]t - l

[% Budg~t in Level
% Budg~t in Level 1

Department Size

[
Dept. B'mf;get ] x 10 O''.Ki
T,o ul stat e 'Budg~t t
Policy Changes
Lake View education finance equity litigation

Annual budget process
Year 2009 and beyond

To test hypotheses about stability and economic responsiveness, our key
explanatory variables are previous year budget decisions and positive and negative changes in economic condition. We include an interaction variable that
combines previous year’s budget decision with the magnitude of the change in
economic condition. This interaction variable is intended to capture how forces for stability may be either amplified or attenuated by the need to be responsive to external economic pressures. We also include variables to capture policy changes that may affect budget decision making. To capture the effects of
the Lake View educational finance equity court decision, we include dummy
variables for fiscal years 2005, 2006, and 2007. Those years represent the re-
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sults of regular and special sessions where the Legislature was continually
reforming education funding to reflect court rulings in the ongoing case as
well as the court ordered education study (Jordan et al., 2014). In addition,
because the Lake View case was expected to have a specific impact on K12
education, we include three dummy variables that capture the combination of
K12 department and the years 2005, 2006, and 2007, respectively. The change
to annual budgeting (as opposed to biennial budgeting) took effect in 2008,
impacting budget decisions for the fiscal year 2009 and all years following.
We include a dummy variable for all years post 2008 to account for this budget process change. Finally, we control for department size by including a
measure of departmental budget as a percent of the state’s total budget. Given
ARSA’s prioritization structure, we expect there to be little differences across
departments for higher priority budget levels in terms of allocation ratios.
With lower priority levels we expect the reverse; differences across departments will occur. The descriptive statistics for all the variables used in the
regression analysis are provided in Table 4.
We estimate the following regression models:

(%Budget in :Level 2;)
% of Budget in Level it =

i

+
+

i,1

~% Budget in Level 1

t-l

Personal Income+,t-1 +

i

Personal Income–,t-1

i

f% Budget in Level 2 )
Personal Incomet-1× ~% Budget in Level 1
Dept. Budget )
(
x100%
"J
otal
:S itate Budget t-l
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Given the stability hypothesis that budgeting for higher priority items tend
to be more stable and incremental, 1,1 and 3,1 are expected to be negative.
However, 2,1, which captures the incrementalism effects on lower priority
budget levels is not expected to be statistically significant. Consistent with
Hypothesis 2 that lower priority budget items are more responsive to economic conditions, 2,2 (economic growth) is expected to be positive and 2,3 (economic decline) is expected to be negative. Given expected stronger response to
negative changes in economic conditions, the magnitude of 2,3 is also expected to be larger than 2,2. Similarly, 3,2 (the ratio of level 2 to level 1) is
expected to be positive in a growing economy and negative in a declining
economy, 3,3. In terms of interactions between forces for stability and responsiveness, we expect all coefficients ( 1,4, 2,4 and 3,4) to be statistically significant. We do not expect Level 1 prioritization to be dependent on department
size, so 1,5 is not expected to be statistically significant. However, we expect
department size to matter for low priority budget items and for 2,5 to be statistically significant. We do not have any expectations for coefficients of the
Lake View educational finance equity litigation dummy variables ( i,6 through
i,8). However, given that the case was expected to have specific impact on
prioritizing K12 education, we expect 1,9, 1,10 and 1,11 (K12 department and
the reform years) to be positive. Finally, while we control for the switch to an
annual budget process, we do not have specific expectations regarding statistical significance or signage for i,12.
With panel data of 11 departments across 23 years, we use feasible generalized least squares (FGLS) to estimate models for the three dependent variables: percent of department budget in priority Level 1, percent of department
budget in priority Level 2, and ratio of department budget in Level 2 to Level
1. Our analysis relies on panel data that includes cross-sectional (departments)
and time-series (fiscal years) information. Several diagnostics and tests were
conducted to determine the correct model specification and linear regression
approach, particularly out of concern for heteroscedasticity across departments
and correlation within and/or between the departments. Statistically significant
results of the likelihood ratio test (p<.0001) indicated panel-level heteroscedasticity. The Woolridge test for autocorrelation in the panel data (p<.0001)
indicated serial autocorrelation, subsequently the Lagrange-Multiplier test
(p<.0001) indicated presence of first-order autocorrelation. Statistically significant results for the Breusch-Pagan Lagrange Multiplier test of cross-sectional
independence (p<.0001) and Pasaran cross-sectional dependence test
(p<.0001)
indicate
the
presence
of
cross-sectional
dependence/contemporaneous correlations. FGLS was selected to estimate the model
since it allowed for (1) first-order serial correlation in the dependent variables
within each department where the coefficient on the auto-regressive process is
specific to each department (panel-specific first-order auto-regressive autocorrelation), (2) heteroscedasticity across panels, and (3) cross-sectional correla-
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tions. FGLS is a more efficient estimation procedure than the pooled OLS,
fixed effects, and random effects modeling approaches typically used in crosssectional, time-series analysis. For our analysis, we utilize FGLS estimation in
the presence of panel-specific first-order autoregressive autocorrelation within
panels, contemporaneous cross-sectional correlation, and heteroskedasticity
across panels. The Stata xgls command with the option corr (psar1) was used.
8. RESULTS
Our analysis utilizes FGLS estimation in the presence of panel-specific,
first-order autoregressive autocorrelation within panels, contemporaneous
cross-sectional correlation, and heteroskedasticity across panels. Results of the
three regression models using FGLS are presented in Table 5.
We hypothesized that budgeting for higher priority items tends to be more
stable and incremental in nature due to the need to maintain or protect basic
funding needs. Lower priority items, on the other hand, are considered more
discretionary and often subject to greater decision making scrutiny. Therefore,
allocation decisions for lower priority budget levels are expected to be less
subject to incremental decision making and instead be more open and responsive to economic forces and the perceived likelihood of greater or lesser revenues.
Results for Model 1 show that budgeting for Level 1 is indeed incremental,
as the coefficient for the stability indicator is statistically significant. The coefficients in Models 1 and 2 capture the average effects (across departments and
over time) of the explanatory variables on the percentage of the department’s
budget in the respective priority levels. In Model 1, the greater the previous
year’s budget allocation of Level 2 relative to Level 1 (i.e. greater allocation
for lower priority budget items) the lower the current year’s allocation for
Level 1. For every one percent increase in the ratio of the previous year’s allocation for Level 2 to Level 1, the percentage of the budget allocated for Level
1 decreases by 11% in the current year. This is consistent with Hypothesis 1.
Surprisingly, results for Model 2 (percent of budget in Level 2) also suggest
incremental budgeting for lower priority budget items, but the coefficient is
only marginally significant at p<.10. The coefficient for the stability variable
was not statistically significant in Model 3.
We can compare the effects of incrementalism across Levels 1 and 2 by
analyzing the coefficients using average values. If the previous year’s budget
had 1% more allocated in Level 2 (from 2.10% to 3.10%) and 1% less allocated in Level 1 (from 95.45% to 94.45%), the corresponding increase in
3 ·10 " - 0.0243 = o. oos)
[% Budget in Level .2 ]
% Budget in Level 1 t-t is 0.008 ( 94.4596
.
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Table 5. Regression results of panel data linear models using FGLS
Model 1:

Model 2:

Model 3:
% Bo dg.et in LevseJ 2

%Budget in
Level 1

%Budget
in Level
2

%, Bo dg.et in LevseJ !I.

-10.699*

9.034t

0.088

% Personal Incomet,+

-0.0596

0.173

0.00187

% Personal Incomet,–

0.614**

-0.341**

-0.00374*

8.349***

0.0988***

-0.0060

0.024*

0.000244t

Year 2005

2.667t

-1.382t

-0.0163

Year 2006

0.039

2.743***

0.0365***

Year 2007

2.747t

2.284**

0.0290**

K12 department AND Year 2005

2.160*

-.733

-0.00555

K12 department AND Year 2006

0.772

-0.852

-0.0169

K12 department AND Year 2007

3.748***

-3.891*

-0.0491**

2.866***

-1.184

-0.0135*

96.379***

0.884*

0.0104*

Estimated Covariances

66

66

66

Estimated Autocorrelations

11

11

11

Estimated Coefficients

13

13

13

No. of Observations

242

No. of Groups

11

Time Periods

22

Stability

% Budget in Level Z]
[
% Budget in Level 1 t 1
Responsiveness

% Budg~t in Level :i! ]
%,A.Personal IID£iQ\Diet X [% Bu:dg~t in 'Level 1 ~--8.602***
l
Department Size

[ Dept, Budget ] X ] OO''Ki
T,oital State Budget t
Policy Changes
Lake View education finance equity litigation

Annual budget process
Year 2009 and beyond
Constant
Model Summary

2

t

p<.10; * p<.05; ** p<.01; ***p<.001

56.73***

I

66.01***

61.72***

I
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The budget allocated in Level 1 for the average department decreases from
95.45% to 95.36%, which is 0.09% lower ( 10.699×0.008 = 0.086). The
budget allocated in Level 2 for the average department increases from 2.10%
to 2.17% (increase is 9.034×0.008 = 0.072). The percent change in the percentages allocated in Levels 1 and 2 were 0.09% and 3.44%, respectively.
Consistent with Hypothesis 1, incrementalism has a larger magnitude effect on
the actual amount of funds budgeted in Level 1 compared to Level 2. However, in terms of the relative impact, Level 2 was affected to a larger extent, as
a change in previous year’s budget decisions caused a greater percentage
change on the amount budgeted for Level 2.
In terms of responsiveness, Hypothesis 2 posits that lower priority budget
levels will be influenced by economic conditions. The responsiveness to negative economic condition variable (% Personal Incomet,–) in Model 2 is statistically significant and negative. This indicates that decision makers respond to
expected economic downturns by decreasing the percent of the department
budget allocated in the lower priority Level 2. Correspondingly, the same
measure of responsiveness is statistically significant and positive in Model 1.
The results of Model 3 reflect the same pattern of results, with the coefficient
being statistically significant and negative.
Overall, these results show that the extent of receptiveness is dependent on
whether the economic condition is perceived to be favorable or unfavorable.
When the economic condition is perceived to be favorable (% Personal Incomet,+), there is no statistically significant effect on budget decisions. However, the percent of the budget in Level 1 increases and Level 2 decreases if the
economic condition is perceived as unfavorable (% Personal Incomet,–). A 1%
decline in per capita personal income produces a 0.61% increase in the percentage of the budget allocated in Level 1 and a 0.34% decline in the budget
allocated in Level 2. However, given the mean percentage of the budget in
Level 1 of 95.45% and Level 2 of 2.10% across all the departments, the relative impact is higher on the Level 2 budget with a 16.19%
( 0..34i%
2.10 %

= 16,.19%)

decline in the budget allocated in Level 2. In contrast, the
( 0 .62 %
1

= 0.64i%)

0.62% increase in the Level 1 budget represents a 0.64%
growth in the budget. As hypothesized, then, the lower priority budget level
(Level 2) is affected to a greater degree by perceptions of economic conditions, in support of rational decision-making.
95,. 45 96

In terms of the interactions between stability and responsiveness, results
show that the Level 1 budget is affected to a greater degree than the Level 2
budget (the magnitude of the coefficient for Level 1 was 8.602, compared to
8.349 for Level 2), but the differences between the two are not statistically
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significantly different than zero. We can conclude, then, that both Level 1 and
Level 2 budgets are simultaneously influenced by both measures of stability
and responsiveness, and that the size of the influence is equal across the two
levels but in opposite directions.
Given ARSA’s prioritization structure, we also expect there to be little differences across departments for higher priority budget levels in terms of allocation ratios, and the reverse for lower priority departments. We see this in the
results of our regression analysis, where department size (relative to the state
budget) is statistically significant in Model 2 but not in Model 1. The coefficient for department size is marginally significant at p<.10 in Model 3.
It is also important to note that budget decisions are affected by policy
change. Specifically, decision makers appear to respond to changes in the decision making process (i.e. a shift to annual budgeting) and to changes in priorities (the Lake View education finance equity court decision that made K12
education a funding priority). The dummy variable for the annual budget process period (Year 2009 and beyond) was statistically significant in Model 1
(positive signage) and Model 3 (negative signage). These results suggest that
as the state moved to an annual budget, the decision makers increased the
amount of the budget they prioritized as Level 1. With an annual budget process, each year’s budget undergoes a thorough review process. There is more
frequent scrutiny of resource allocation decisions compared to a biennial
budget process where off-year budgets face less review. Decision makers and
department advocates may feel the need to protect the budgets – which come
under more scrutiny post-2009 – by placing more of the budget in Level 1.
This added scrutiny may be due to the shift to annual budgeting, but could also
be due to the tightening of state budgets due to the recent recession.
The Lake View education finance equity court decision also had an effect
on all departments, as the decision makers attempt to protect the budgets by
increasing the percentages of the budget they place in Level 1. A much more
pronounced increase was seen for K12 departmental budgets, with the strongest effect being seen in fiscal year 2007. In fiscal years 2005 and 2007, this
department increased its reliance on Level 1 spending by 4.83%
(2.16+2.67=4.83) and 6.50% (2.75+3.75=6.50), respectively.
Interestingly, the dummy variables for years 2006 and 2007 were statistically significant and positive in Models 2 and 3. These results could reflect the
impacts of the Lake View education finance equity litigation, but may also
reflect the boom in government revenues. The assurances of surplus revenues
may have prompted decision makers to be more assured that funds would be
distributed for lower level budget item. Such confidence may have made them
more likely to increase the percentage of the budget categorized as lower priority (Level 2).
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9. CONCLUSION
Jordan’s (2006) previous finding that the highest priority items are stable
and lower priority items are volatile is confirmed; however, there has been a
growth in the proportion of the budget prioritized in Level 1of the departments
examined. This increase in Level 1 may be the result of protectionism during
the Great Recession of the departments examined here. Interestingly, the
Grand Total of the state budget in Level 1 is about 91%, indicating that a decline in the proportion of the department budgets in Level 1 for departments
not included in this study compensated much of the increase in Level 1 for the
departments in our study. Overall, the results indicate that the ARSA approach
to budgeting favors stability, regardless of priority level. However, ARSA also
allows for responsiveness to economic conditions, but with a larger effect for
the lower priority budget items. Furthermore, the extent of this responsiveness
varies depending on whether economic conditions are expected to be favorable
or unfavorable. Finally, department size also plays a role in decisions regarding discretionary (lower priority) budget items, with larger departments having
greater reliance on lower priority budget levels.
Incrementalism continues to be a strong influence on budget changes in
our first two models, even in the presence of rational decision making. This is
similar to Reddick’s (2003) findings that incremental decision making occurs
in conjunction with rational decision making. The previous year’s budget is
still of primary importance to decision makers, especially as they determine
the proportion of the budget to place in the top two priority levels.
Our findings suggest that the rational consideration of a decline in the
economy impacts prioritization, while the expectation of an economic upturn
does not influence prioritization. This suggests that when the economy is
good, there is no need to reprioritize, and the status quo is maintained. On the
other hand, a declining economy is associated with an increase in the percent
of the budget in the top priority level and a decline in Level 2. Details of the
decline in Level 2 cannot be determined from the data. However, the decline is
statistically significant and could reflect a shift in the location of budget items
or a decline in the budgeted amount. Furthermore, it is important to note that
during a declining economy, the top priority is protected, which is the goal of
ARSA.
The interaction of economic responsiveness and budget stability is significant at the 0.001 level across all models, and the magnitude on prioritizing
Level 1 and Level 2 are quite strong. Simultaneously, the incremental influence of the previous year’s budget and the rational influence of economic conditions are related to prioritization. Given the separate and combined magnitudes of the budget stability and economic responsiveness, our findings suggest that incrementalism is still a powerful influence.
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ARSA is yet another way that rationality and incrementalism coexist in
budgeting. Decision makers (the Governor and the Legislature) must categorize the budgets into priority levels. Categorization is influenced largely by
what existed in the prior year; however, change in economic condition also
influences that prioritization, especially an economic decline. The top priority
level is more protected during an economic downturn, creating more stability
for the highest priority. This suggests that ARSA is achieving its purpose of
stabilization during negative revenue fluctuations.
The key limitation of this study is that the ARSA legislation and process
are unique to one state. However, the transferable value of the findings is that
prioritization could be an effective form of contingency planning that is an
alternative or supplement to a state rainy day fund. Prioritization may help
states to preserve their rainy day funds for periods of extreme or prolonged
revenue stagnation or decline like the states experienced with the Great Recession. The fact that the Grand Total of Arkansas’ budget in the top priority level is approximately 92%, while the departments studied here ranged from 92%
to 98% in Level 1, indicates some lowering of priorities in other departments
not studied. While the resulting 8% cushion in the total budget is still greater
than most states’ rainy day funds, the caution to states that choose to implement budgeting by priorities is that the effectiveness of the method can only
be sustained if a significant proportion of the budget is below Level 1.
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